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Explanation in Historical Sociology:
Narrative, General Theory, and Historically
Specific Theory1
Craig Calhoun
New York University
Sociologists seem doomed to fight the methodenstreit again and again.
For every practitioner of intelligent division of labor or multidimensional
research, there are a dozen advocates of one against the other.
Reopening the debate, Kiser and Hechter (1991) argue that historical
sociologists have modeled themselves too much on historians, seduced by
the desire to understand particular cases and the temptation to find
knowledge through induction rather than general theory. In response,
Skocpol (1994) denies that this argument sticks to her, and suggests that in
any case it says little about specific explanations as distinct from abstract
standards. Quadagno and Knapp (1992) argue that Kiser and Hechter
have too narrow a notion of theory and that they fail to see how narrative
history can help to build theory. Somers (in this issue) defends narrative
as a dimension of theory itself. Along with the other critics, Somers also
responds vigorously to the way in which Kiser and Hechter combine an
ostensibly neutral, abstract argument for general theory with advocacy
for rational choice theory. Some of Kiser andHechter’s position on general
theory—such as the claim that “all good sociological explanations” must
contain separate arguments about the motives of individual actors—thus
derives more from the substance of rational choice theory than frommeth-
odological principles independent of specific theories. Somers accepts the
argumentative gambit offered by Kiser and Hechter: to debate approaches
to historical sociology as a replay of the methodenstreit, reworked in line
with new trends in the philosophy of science.
This is unfortunate, though Kiser and Hechter invite it. They argue not
simply about what will make for better sociological knowledge but also
on the more philosophical terrain of “what adequate explanations must
entail” (1991, p. 4). The result is to bring into often confusing combination
three different kinds of argument: (1) about general epistemological and
1 Direct correspondence to Craig Calhoun, Department of Sociology, New York Uni-
versity, 269 Mercer Street, Fourth Floor, New York, New York 10003.
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scientific principles, (2) about the role of theory in historical sociology, and
(3) about the merits or demerits of rational choice theory as an exemplar
of general theory. I will have the least to say about the last of these, since
I think the merits of rational choice theory are best debated in terms of
the new knowledge produced by its use rather than in terms of abstract
sermons about what constitutes a good sort of theory.
The heart of the argument is about what counts as a good explanation
and how such explanations might be pursued. Kiser and Hechter empha-
size the centrality of causal explanations based on deductions from general
theories that include abstract models, covering laws, and mechanisms.
They denigrate other approaches to scientific knowledge. In this they fol-
low mainstream philosophers from a generation or two ago, but they also
lay claim to the more recently fashionable label of “realist” philosophy of
science. Somers challenges this with a broader and more complex reading
of (and to some extent intervention in) contemporary debates in philoso-
phy of science and with her own claim to be a realist.2 Resort to philoso-
phy, however, does not bring clarity to the exchange (even though clarity
is one of the main goods philosophers of science ostensibly have on offer).
This is largely because the colloquy between Kiser and Hechter and Som-
2 Somers designates Kiser and Hechter’s position “theoretical realism” and her own
“relational realism.” In response, Kiser and Hechter claim that there is a clear “stan-
dard usage” among philosophers as to the term “realist” and that it fits their usage.
Readers should be wary of attempts to settle arguments by claiming to discern clear
standard usages in other disciplines. Kiser and Hechter do not make much use of
the philosophical realist who has probably had the most influential engagement with
sociology, Bhaskar (see, esp. 1978, 1986). As their only recent authority on the position,
they cite Bunge (1996). He is indeed a prolific advocate of realism, but far from sug-
gesting a standard usage, he finds it necessary to describe his position as “critical
realism” to distinguish it from the many other claimants to the rhetorically desirable
realist label. Putnam (1987) refers to the “many faces of realism.” Generic realism, for
what it is worth, is a philosophical position rejecting both extreme forms of idealism
(“the world is just my dream”) and thoroughgoing empiricism (the inductivism that
Popper [1979] called “the bucket theory of the mind”; see also Miller 1985, pp. 101–
17). Along with common sense, it holds that what is real is not limited to either sensory
experience or our internally developed ideas. It acknowledges nonobservables as part
of reality. The point in philosophy of science is to give theory (and beliefs and conjec-
tures that may not quite add up to theories) standing alongside empirical inductions.
At least in most versions, then, progress in knowledge is held to depend on both new
observations and new thought about available observations. Thought (including the-
ory) may play a role in producing useful observations; some thoughts (conjectures)
are also corrigible by such observations; these are the ones most useful to science.
Realism does not entail a Popperian belief in the progressive corrigibility of theories
by empirical refutations, but the latter is consistent with and typical of a realist posi-
tion. At the same time, realism suggests that the human world is always partly the
product of our thought (and hence our culture); we cannot grasp it as a purely external
reality (see Putnam 1987).
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ers replicates divisions among philosophers, including notably that be-
tween “analytic” and both “Continental” and pragmatist approaches.3 Phi-
losophers are very smart people, and their inability to find a way out of
this long-standing division reflects, among other things, the enormous
power that differing perspectives, criteria of judgment, and decisions as
to what questions to ask have over the production of knowledge.
Here, I wish to clarify some of what is at stake for the relationship
among history, theory, and sociological knowledge. I wish also to argue
against the rather extreme “either/or” choice between history and theory,
description and explanation, narrative and causal analysis that readers
might draw from the debate as currently presented.
RAMPANT INDUCTIVISM IN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY?
According to Kiser and Hechter (in this issue, p. 786), “Whereas historical
sociologists traditionally had insisted on distinguishing social science from
history, now many sought to do away with the boundary between these
disciplines.” This boundary Kiser and Hechter see as that between idio-
graphic and nomothetic approaches, induction and deduction, particular
descriptions and general theories. This was always tendentious language,
and presumed that a clear distinction could be drawn between the two
kinds of inquiry. It grasps some differences between the disciplines, but
it also distorts; certainly it is a caricature of what contemporary historians
do to say that they seek only descriptions of historical particulars. It also
implies objections to a wide range of sociological work, identifying as
mainstream only a very specific kind of explanatory enterprise—and con-
signing not just narrative historical work but most qualitative sociology
and much survey research to the descriptivist, idiographic, inductive pe-
riphery.
Kiser and Hechter draw their evidence for an antitheoretical turn from
some abstract arguments against certain uses of theory rather than from
3 In the article published as part of this debate, Kiser and Hechter show themselves
to be less naive readers of philosophy of science than Somers suggests, but they do
appear to have limited their reading to publications that suited their tastes, and to
have grasped less well the divisions among philosophers. In an early draft of their
critique of Somers, Kiser and Hechter referenced Searle (1993) to support their con-
tention that “the vast majority of American philosophy departments refused to endorse
views of the sort that Somers espouses.” The vast majority of American sociology
departments refuse to endorse rational choice theory, but one doubts whether this
persuades Kiser and Hechter that it is false. In any case, “American” is a key word
in the quoted sentence. The “analytic” taste in philosophy is especially Anglo-Saxon.
“Views of the sort that Somers espouses” are given more respect by philosophers else-
where.
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an examination of actual research. In fact, recent historical sociology
draws on theory and frequently advances it. Consider Gould’s (1995) use
of network theory, Goldstone’s (1991) of structural and demographic the-
ory, and Goodwin’s (1997) of theory of emotions as well as networks (to
take only prominent authors whose names begin with G ).
Since the inception of the discipline, historical sociologists have theo-
rized historical patterns of continuity and change in both evolutionary
and nonevolutionary models. Sociologists have also turned to history for
data by which to test more limited theories and have developed theories
partly through induction from historical scholarship. The critical discus-
sions of theory that Kiser and Hechter cite actually come from a period
of resurgence in historical sociology. Though important work earlier in
the postwar period contributed to this resurgence (Smith 1991), the sub-
field only gained critical mass and institutionalization in the 1970s and
early 1980s. That it did so then reflected widespread theoretical concerns:
to address social change and power relations; to restore agency to sociolog-
ical analysis; to “denaturalize” social conditions by seeing paths that
shaped them and ways in which they might have been otherwise. Reaction
against functionalism, an attempt to overcome the marginalization of
Marxism, and new readings of Weber all influenced this renewal of histor-
ical inquiry within sociology. So did a desire to pursue theory by pursuing
history.
Historical sociologists recognized that extant theories of many impor-
tant dimensions of modern society were based on implicit historical prem-
ises that needed to be reconsidered. Modernization theory, for example,
had incorporated an account of early modern European history, which it
then used to generate propositions for the study of social change in the
rest of the world. It was not enough to test the propositions so generated
(many of which did indeed prove dubious); it was important to reconsider
the premises themselves on the basis of newer historical research. In a
literal and important sense, then, the goal of much of the new historical
sociology was to change the basic inductions that formed part of the core
of sociological theories and provided the basis from which deductions
were made. For this purpose, it was important that sociologists turn to
history with an agenda that went beyond testing propositions derived
from general theory. Of course, part of what enabled new historical re-
search to generate new findings was change in analytic perspectives—
such as greater concern for “history from below” and the role of power
and conflict in shaping social change.
Explicitly or inexplicitly, this challenged some of the post-methoden-
streit understandings of an older generation. Many had treated the social
world simply as so many neutral instances of naturally occurring phenom-
ena. For the newer historical sociologists, especially Marxists and Weberi-
849
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ans, the contemporary social world was a specific configuration produced
by historical struggles. In other words, the social world as it presented
itself at one time was a particular, a singular conjuncture, as much as it
was a cumulation of cases of more general processes. To say, for example,
that it was predominantly capitalist was not only to indicate what theory
would fit best with many replicable empirical data within it, but it was
also to characterize the whole and to locate it in history. This was a theo-
retical claim.
Over time, historical sociology became domesticated as a style of re-
search in American sociology (Calhoun 1997b). It lost its theoretical
agenda (and the political agenda that shaped the interest of many in the
1970s and 1980s). Many sociologists turned to historical research, but it
became increasingly hard to identify any common theory or approach to
theory as dominant in or unifying of historical sociology. This is somewhat
ironic, since much of the impetus for the rise of historical sociology came
from theoretical issues and arguments, but it reflects the extent to which
the legitimation of historical sociology as a subfield within the discipline
was achieved by portraying it (misleadingly) as a method.
Rather than emphasizing sociology’s substantive need for history—the
need for social theory to be intrinsically historical—Skocpol, Tilly, and
others argued that historical sociology should be accepted because it was
or could be comparably rigorous to other forms of empirical sociology.
Moreover, it was the only way to fill certain important gaps in empirical
knowledge—for example, of rare events or phenomena that only happen
over a long time span. Tilly (1984) emphasized the operationalization of
quantitative sociological research and analytic methods for historical use;
he engaged in important comparative studies, but he also warned against
overreliance on a comparative strategy. Skocpol (1979; Skocpol and Som-
ers 1980) placed a distinctive stress on comparison. While Skocpol’s (1979)
cases happened to be historical, her analytic method was less distinctively
so. Indeed, her later analysis of the creation of state welfare programs in
the United States was much more intrinsically historical (Skocpol 1992).
Emphasis on method obscured the importance of theory. Still, it is not
entirely clear why Kiser and Hechter present their argument mainly as a
challenge to historical sociology. In the first place, if they are right about
the desirability of pursuing generalizable knowledge through identifying
lawlike relationships and causal mechanisms, then this applies to all soci-
ology (and, indeed, to all science). Second, historical sociology seems nei-
ther an extreme nor a typical case by which to make the argument for this
version of general theory; symbolic interactionist fieldwork might qualify
better as the former, survey research as the latter. Third, and most impor-
tant, Kiser and Hechter do not address in a sustained way the specificity
850
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of historical research or the place of historical reasoning in theory.4 Doing
so would have made the connection to historical sociology clearer.
Kiser and Hechter (1991, pp. 1–2) are concerned mainly that “compara-
tive-historical sociologists are tending to move from arguments against
specific theories to arguments against theory in general” (emphasis in orig-
inal). But they are not interested in “theory in general,” that is, in the
range of intellectual products and orientations sociologists call theory, so
much as in what they call “general theory.” By this they refer to formula-
tions of explicit assumptions, abstract scope conditions, and models that
include both lawlike statements of relations and causal mechanisms. Such
theories are to be the basis for deducing potentially testable propositions,
including causal explanations of events. Their generality inheres both in
the lawlike statements of relationships (which are ideally universal and
at least uniform—in the sense that similar causes always produce similar
effects) and in the mechanisms that are abstract enough to be used in
analyzing multiple concrete events.5 Preference for this sort of theory is
4 The illustration Kiser and Hechter (1991) offer, based on studies by Skocpol and
Mann, considers variations in state autonomy as a question abstracted from historical
context. Contrast this to studying the development of the modern state as a historically
specific process (which indeed both Skocpol and Mann do).
5 Most of what Kiser and Hechter discuss has been a familiar part of texts and classes
in theory construction for some time. The partial exception is their strong emphasis
on causal mechanisms. Here they join in a vogue for reviving an idea historically
linked to notions of strict causality, but using it in the context of more probabilistic
models. Rational choice theory has played an important role in encouraging more
emphasis on causal mechanisms alongside covering laws or causal relationships. Kiser
and Hechter are actually somewhat vague about what is involved here, and their
language shifts a bit between seeing the mechanisms as necessarily deduced from
lawlike statements, and as simply being lawlike statements but of a different order
from relationships of implication or correlation. One way of seeing what is at stake
is to recognize that classical ideas of causation considered it as a relationship of force;
all causes were agents exerting power over patients. This account ran into trouble in
the 17th and 18th centuries, especially among empiricists. Failure to observe causes
operating as external relations of force led to a variety of theoretical responses. Among
these was Hume’s argument that what we observe is the spatiotemporal conjunction
of events, not the necessary connections that previous theorists understood as causes.
The idea of causality then became, for Hume, a matter of psychological imputation
rather than an empirical observation. The notion of mechanisms came to prominence
as an attempt to identify the ways in which connections were actually formed between
objects and is especially important to “realist” theories willing to discuss causation
even when it cannot be directly observed. Such mechanisms come in two forms: actual
energy transfers and triggers or signals that do not involve substantial material force.
Many important causes in social life are of the latter sort, which means that there
can be no presumption of a “proportionate” material relationship between cause and
effect (Bunge 1996, p. 31). This is one reason why social life is full of nonlinear relation-
ships (see Abbott 1988). These do not invalidate causal analysis, but they make it
hard to use some traditional ways of reasoning about causation.
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the basis for Kiser and Hechter’s (1991, p. 2) complaint that the “new
wave” of historical sociologists is too inductive: “The structure of their
arguments . . . tends not to be implicative (involving deductive logic), but
conjunctive (involving the use of coherent narrative).”
Behind this preference lie two distinct though related philosophical con-
troversies. One is the classic question of the methodenstreit, whether the
human sciences need be distinguished methodologically from the physical
and biological sciences. Arguments for such a distinction are generally
grounded in three claims. First, human nature is never fully independent
from culture and is modified by historical change. Second, we do not un-
derstand human action adequately by explaining it solely in terms of exter-
nal antecedent causal conditions; such factors need to be supplemented
at least by inquiry into motives and purposes and the pursuit of empathic
understanding (verstehen). Third, many of the important events concern-
ing humanity happen only once or very rarely and thus cannot be ex-
plained by theories focused on patterns in repetitious events such as those
of nature.
The second controversy concerns the problem of induction. Kiser and
Hechter use the same term to designate both the belief that basic catego-
ries of thought (like causality) derive from psychological experience and
the attempt to make empirical generalizations basic premises of social
theory. The former is inductivism in a strict epistemological sense, the
latter a more general sort of empiricism. Arguments against the former
are not necessarily decisive against the latter.
The status of causal reasoning is a classic issue that has bedeviled phi-
losophers since Hume. Hume ([1748] 1902) famously argued that all pure
empirical induction could yield was the knowledge that events were con-
joined in space and time. The idea of cause could not be given by experi-
ence alone. Hume was content simply to focus on empirical generaliza-
tions without reliance on the notion of an unobservable causation.
Defending causality and the greater certainty of lawlike knowledge, ideal-
ists were prepared to argue then that an idea of causation was given to
the human mind a priori. They, more than empiricists, are ancestors of
today’s “realists.” Durkheim ([1912] 1965) famously accepted the argu-
ment that individual experience could not produce basic categories of
thought, but held that causality and the others were not simply a priori,
but given by society. Eventually, Popper ([1934] 1959, 1972) and others
saw that part of the intractability of the problem lay in the very empiricist
presuppositions with which Hume and others began. In Popper’s phrase,
they worked with a “bucket theory of mind,” believing that there is noth-
ing in our intellect that has not entered it through the senses.
Popper argued that we should distinguish psychological questions (e.g.,
852
Symposium: Calhoun
about how we learn) from logical questions (such as whether an inference
is valid). As a logical question, the problem of induction concerns centrally
how we can determine the truth or falsity “of universal laws relative to
some ‘given’ test statements” (Popper 1972, p. 8).6 Test statements are
hypothetical singular descriptions of observable events; they may be
judged true or false on the basis of experience (in science, usually experi-
ence guided by observational technique). They establish good reasons for
accepting universal laws as true, though of course the latter remain con-
jectures subject to possible future refutation.7 Whether empirical conjunc-
tures suggest causal connections to us remains a psychological matter;
logically they are important as tests for propositions derived from conjec-
tural laws, not the basis for such hypothetical statements. We may gain
a great deal of knowledge from empirical generalization thus, but in itself
this will not enable us to arrive at universal laws.
Kiser and Hechter maintain Popper’s sharp distinction between the
context of discovery and the context of justification, but are somewhat
confusing in this regard. They purport to describe, for example, “the fail-
ure of induction to suggest causal mechanisms” (1991, p. 15). This is an
extreme overstatement, however, since many causal mechanisms have
been suggested to scientists of all sorts (including historical sociologists)
by direct inductive observation (combined with some reasoning). Kiser
and Hechter are right, however, that causal mechanisms cannot be speci-
fied on the basis of induction alone. Because they are not directly observ-
able, their specification depends on inference from indirect tests. It is the
latter in which Popperian scientists are interested. It does not matter to
them so much how social scientists get their ideas as how they test them.
Kiser and Hechter might reply that they would prefer that explanatory
ideas be deductions from general theories, but it is unlikely that all new
ideas as to causal mechanisms will be produced this way (even if one
thinks this is the best way to formulate them). It would be more accurate
to say that for the view they express it does not matter whether scientists
get their ideas by deduction or by inspiration while taking a shower. What
matters is that they are able to account for those ideas in terms of the
deductive structures of general theories so that their possible falsification
can contribute to the advance of theory.
6 “Given” is in inverted commas because Popper wishes to call attention to a further
class of problems pertaining to the empirical validity of test statements, including
whether we can speak of experienced instances prior to the theories that define them
as instances of test statements.
7 This is one of the key distinctions between Popper’s critical realism and positivism.
Positivists commonly hold that certain truths are established outside this process of
infinite corrigibility.
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By contrast, Somers (p. 732), in line with Kuhn and recent science stud-
ies, would argue that the idea of a sharp separation between contexts of
discovery and justification is misleading. It allows for scientists to repre-
sent their work as fitting more fully into canonical models of inquiry than
it usually does, and it systematically underplays the concrete histories in
which new data, understandings, and theories are produced. If in fact
changes in theories are always historically produced in a field of available
alternatives, then formal justifications in terms of covering law theories
and the like are at best partial accounts of why the changes have occurred.
One must account also for what has been studied and what has not, for
what sorts of observations could be gathered under given research condi-
tions, and so on. Which topics are considered interesting, which archives
are open, what technologies aid access? There is no reason to assume that
these are simply uniform filters on progress; they shape sharp turns in the
orientation of knowledge as well as variations in its rate of accumulation.
Accounts of such factors may take narrative form. It is worth noting,
though, that similar strictures apply to narrative. It is not sufficient simply
to tell the story of what has occurred without inquiring into the conditions
of these empirical events and the factors that selected this actual history
from other possible ones, and into the rhetorical tastes and practices that
guided the construction of the narrative.
GENERAL THEORY AND HISTORICAL EXPLANATION
When historical sociologists speak of induction, they seldommean to enter
into debates on basic epistemological problems. Proponents usually mean,
rather, to suggest that the amount of insight or “explanation” provided
by highly general theories is modest, partly because such theories do too
much violence to the specifics of the historical patterns. These proponents
propose to build knowledge of those patterns “upward” from empirical
specifics.8 Opponents, like Kiser and Hechter (1991, p. 9), charge that this
8 As it happens, many of the “inductivist” historical sociologists rely heavily on the
published works of historians to produce the empirical descriptions from which they
work. The issue is not precisely nearness to archives, nor even nearness to facts, but
something more like breadth and depth of knowledge of conditions and events. Thus
Stinchcombe’s (1978) call for historical sociologists to pay less attention to general
theories and more to analogies between empirical instances is a call for attention to
complexity of patterns in richly understood cases, and comparisons among such cases,
rather than fitting of such cases into abstract theories. But note here that Stinchcombe
works with a sense of general theory different from that held by Kiser and Hechter.
The theories to which he (andmany of the so-called inductivists in historical sociology)
object are theories of “whole events” or even whole historical processes. We may learn
less from a general theory of revolutions, thus, than from detailed comparison of a
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is a sign of “the predominance of historians’ norms” in historical sociology,
with the result that “scope (generality) and analytic power have been mini-
mized and descriptive accuracy has become the predominant criterion for
constructing and judging explanations.” Their complaint, in other words,
is less that historical sociologists are attempting wrongly to produce gen-
eral theories by means of induction than that they are dispensing with
general theory in favor of empirical detail.
This empiricism, it would seem, is what Kiser and Hechter mean by
acting too much like historians. It is indeed a stylistic quirk of historians
to point to the particulars of cases they know well in order to challenge
attempts at generalizations; this makes them threatening book reviewers
for historical sociologists (see Kiser and Hechter 1991, pp. 23–24). Inspired
by 19th-century German “historical science,” American and some other
historians took on the project of studying the past “as it really happened”
(Novick 1988). This became a hallmark of objectivism and a challenge to
all who would read the concerns, values, and indeed theories of a later
age into historical accounts. This was central, for example, to what E. P.
Thompson meant when he proposed “to rescue the poor stockinger, the
Luddite cropper, the ‘obsolete’ hand-loom weaver, the ‘utopian’ artisan,
and even the deluded follower of Joanna Southcott, from the enormous
condescension of posterity” (1968, p. 13) and also when he later railed
against “the poverty of theory” (1978). But despite an ideology of “nothing
but the facts,” historians seldom engage in radical inductivism. They do
not simply walk arbitrarily into archives and demand documents, storing
up facts as the experience dictates. They seek to test existing claims and
extend understanding to new (or hitherto unstudied) events. They treat
studies of specific towns and social movements, fertility rates and royal
succession crises as cases to be compared as well as appreciated in their
specificity. They have theories, even when they choose to express them
implicitly rather than explicitly. Above all, in light of the present debate,
they write narratives that are hardly exercises in induction or indeed in
pure empiricism.
Whatever theory historians use to organize their narrative explanations,
however, is commonly left implicit. Historical sociologists have related to
history partly by making such theory more explicit, subjecting it to logical
handful of revolutions (see Skocpol 1978). But this is a claim about the “context of
discovery” rather than the “context of justification.” In urging us to seek analogies,
Stinchcombe might be understood to be suggesting a procedure well suited for identi-
fying causal mechanisms, as Kiser andHechter would like, rather than arguing against
these. But like Robert Merton (1968) in advocating middle range theory, he is indicat-
ing that we are at an early stage of our quest and ought not to leap to premature
attempts to theorize complex wholes.
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scrutiny, and challenging it substantively. Conversely, they have also re-
lated to theory by challenging its historical presuppositions. As I suggested
at the outset, and as Somers (p. 731) argues, “all social and political theory
is founded on presuppositional historical claims.” Though these may fig-
ure in the “core” of the theory (in the sense of Lakatos [1978]) and thus
not be rendered as propositions subject to empirical test, they may be
challenged directly as to their plausibility. Argument on such points is
appropriately based on historical research.
When Kiser and Hechter refer to explanation, they take it for granted
that this means causal explanation in a covering law model.9 At least for
the purposes of social science, they do not consider it an explanation to
say what something means, or what its social function is, or by what se-
quence of events it came to exist or take on its present form. The kind of
causal explanations that interest Kiser and Hechter are explanations for
the occurrence of “facts,” understood as highly replicable observations
generated under specific theoretically defined conditions (see Bunge 1996,
p. 137). In adopting the covering lawmodel for explanation, they necessar-
ily side with the position that there is no deep difference between the
human and the natural or physical sciences. One side in the methoden-
streit argued that historical change, cultural difference, and individual ac-
tion made such a difference in human affairs that explanation could not
proceed in the same form as it did in physical sciences or even in biology
(though biology was understood to be more like history and social science
than, say, physics or chemistry were). The basic idea of explanation
through covering laws is that an event is explained by subsuming it under
universal laws. More specifically, an explanation requires both statements
of conditions (such as scope of application) and laws (which, as we saw
in discussing Popper, take the form of well grounded but still always con-
tingent hypotheses). The structure of a covering law explanation is virtu-
ally identical with that of a prediction.10 Not everything in the theory is
directly testable, of course, only the empirical statements that are deduced
from it. Its core of assumptions, including basic mechanisms and models,
can only be tested indirectly through tests of the propositions they yield.11
9 The covering lawmodel has many adherents who differ on other specifics. It is linked
especially with Popper, Hempel, Mandelbaum, and Nagel, each of whom has written
specifically about its application in historical explanation. Hempel (1942) wrote per-
haps the decisive article in the ascendancy of the covering lawmodel in the philosophy
of history.
10 See Bunge (1996, chap. 5) for a discussion of the relationship between explanation
and prediction, including reasons why they are not precisely identical.
11 There is a substantial literature concerning what counts as testing and how one may
(or may not) evaluate “progress” in scientific theories. Lakatos (1978) introduced the
idea of a “progressive” scientific research program to describe the capacity of a given
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Kiser and Hechter (especially in the discussion published here) associate
deviation from covering law explanations with the recent rise of “relativ-
ist” science studies, but in fact dissent is long standing. There have been
sympathetic critics who held that the standard of universality set up by
the protagonists of covering law explanations was much too stringent. A
sharper challenge has come from adherents of varying forms of narrative
explanation (Ricoeur 1984). Thinking of natural more than human history,
Goudge (1958) argued that historical explanations commonly, and appro-
priately, rely not on laws but on the specification of a number of conditions
that are jointly sufficient to account for an event when combined in a
coherent narrative sequence. Gallie (1968) maintained that even joint suf-
ficiency was too strong a criterion; it is enough that the temporally prior
necessary conditions be specified. Rather than deducing a class of similar
events from covering laws and instantial conditions, thus, one explains
historical events by placing them in a sequence of statements of condi-
tions. This is the distinction between “implication” and “conjunction” to
which Kiser and Hechter allude. Lest it be thought that “conjunctive”
explanation is mere recourse to Humean association between temporally
contiguous events, note that the criterion of narrative coherence sets quite
different standards, even though they are not of the covering law sort.
Stories come in different genres and a range of disciplines and constraints
shape the formulation of narratives—explanatory or otherwise. Danto
(1965), for example, holds that the involvement of a subject in a story is
crucial to narrative explanation. In any case, a story is neither a regression
of variables against time nor a mere record of events. The identification
of a causal sequence “intrudes” into narrative to give it direction (Gallie
1968, p. 110).
Somers enters the fray with a more substantive defense of narrative
and a further challenge to covering law explanation. Before proceeding
to this, however, we would do well to be a bit more probing about what
covering law explanation and the use of general theory might mean in
actual historical sociology.
Kiser and Hechter are less than clear on this point partly because they
do not distinguish adequately between two claims about the importance
of general theory in historical sociology. One is that general theory is valu-
able as the source of explanations in historical sociology because it allows
us to understand better whatever substantive topic of inquiry motivated
us in the first place. The examples Kiser and Hechter give generally per-
tain to this idea of value. Their major claim about rational choice theory
theory to continue to guide research that produces progressively more successful em-
pirical explanations, while suffering only modest revision at some distance from its
core.
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is that it will be useful to historical sociologists, not that it needs historical
sociology to advance as a theory. The other claim, however, follows even
more basically from the covering law approach to science. This is that
general theory should be employed in historical sociology not so much to
advance immediate historical understanding (though we hope this will
happen) as to advance general theory itself by bringing it under risk of
refutation and stimulation of further creativity by distinctive empirical
data.
In this connection, it is interesting to note the critique of historical soci-
ology offered by John Goldthorpe (1991), almost simultaneously to that
of Kiser and Hechter’s first foray (and surprisingly not mentioned in the
present debate by either them or by Somers). Goldthorpe is also an adher-
ent to a covering law approach to explanation and to the idea that the
development of good general theory is the main object of sociological re-
search. He agrees with Kiser and Hechter that many historical sociologists
are inappropriately blurring the boundary between history and sociology
(somewhat confusingly taking Skocpol as a primary example, though she
has been a strong defender of the disciplinary distinction). Despite the
similar premises, however, Goldthorpe reaches a more or less opposite
conclusion. The burden of his argument is that sociologists have little busi-
ness doing historical research. If they do it well they will simply be histori-
ans, though the odds of this are small given sociologists’ poor training for
doing historical research. More important, historical research is poorly
suited to generating the observations needed to advance general theory
by providing empirical refutations or confirmations for its propositions.
What is needed for the development of more or less universal, lawlike
theoretical statements is a large number of replicable observations, prefer-
ably gathered under controlled conditions. According to Goldthorpe, his-
torical facts are inferences from relics, while the preferred facts of social
science are the results of new, more perspicuous, more complete and re-
peatable observations. “History may serve as, so to speak, a ‘residual cate-
gory’ for sociology, marking the point at which sociologists, in invoking
‘history,’ thereby curb their impulse to generalize or, in other words, to
explain sociologically, and accept the role of the specific and of the contin-
gent as framing—that is, as providing both the setting and the limits—
of their own analyses” (Goldthorpe 1991, p. 14). History is more about
scope conditions than causal generalization, thus. The more we seek the
latter, the better off we are gathering contemporary data.
Why then turn to historical inquiry? Kiser and Hechter give examples
of recent historical sociology in which general theory (rational choice) is
employed to good effect, but these do not answer the question. That is,
Kiser and Hechter give us no reason to think that the studies were decisive
for advancing the general theory as such—for example, for developing
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new micromechanisms that would change analysts’ views of choice pro-
cesses.12 Rather, rational choice theory is shown to be useful for answering
certain particular questions about events and phenomena that are of inter-
est for other reasons. One might be interested in certain historical events
or processes for their own sake, or one might care about a specific histori-
cal narrative—say the history of one’s own nation—which would be ad-
vanced by a better understanding of certain events or processes. Presum-
ably, however, these sound too much like historians’ reasons for Kiser
and Hechter’s taste. This is basically where Kiser and Hechter leave us:
rational choice theory is argued to be useful in analyzing problems the
interest and importance of which it cannot in itself explain.
Alternatively, one might be interested in history because one wished to
advance theory that was itself intrinsically historical. That is, one might
be interested in a better theory of capitalism and thus understand capital-
ism not simply as recurrent events and processes but as a historically spe-
cific and situated phenomenon that not only shapes an epoch but is shaped
by other historical changes and by phases in its development. In any ev-
eryday sense, this would seem an extremely general theoretical project,
but it is not a project of developing general theory in Kiser and Hechter’s
sense. Their sense identifies generality with replicability; that is, specifying
events or processes that will occur over and over again in many cases
when causal conditions are met. This latter approach allows for the study
of many processes within capitalism—investment practices, inflation, la-
bor regimes, and technological obsolescence. It does not allow for the
study of historical capitalism as such.
Theory that is intrinsically historical is not quite theory in Kiser and
Hechter’s sense. Marx’s Capital, Durkheim’s Division of Labor, and
Weber’s Protestant Ethic are among the many works that do not qualify.
Of course, instead of just dropping them from the canon of sociological
theory, we could reanalyze each, trying to find within it a residuum of
useful propositions that could be recast in an ahistorical, covering law
12 Kiser and Hechter (p. 797 above) do assert that translating historical scope condi-
tions into abstract ones allows for insights developed through inquiry into the past
to be applicable to the present and future, and indeed that this is “the most important
contribution that historical sociology can make to the discipline as a whole.” This
does not answer the question of why one would need to turn to historical cases to gain
these insights. It also seems to underestimate the complexity of the task of translating
historical into abstract scope conditions and the extent to which choice of theoretical
languages is likely to influence this. Most important, this presumes the capacity to
abstract cases altogether out of history. This is most plausible when one is concerned
with frequently replicated phenomena; it completely misses problems of historical
singularities (like the rise of capitalism) significant for an entire epoch. Of course, the
frequently replicated phenomena may be parts of more complex and rarer large-scale
phenomena and may shed light on them.
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manner.13 Nonetheless, this would both do violence to these major works
and eliminate much of what has given them enduring theoretical impor-
tance.
My point is not to dismiss the approach to theory that Kiser and
Hechter advocate—either in general metatheoretical terms or in the spe-
cific example of rational choice theory. Rather, I want to suggest that it
is simply not broad enough to encompass the full range of meanings of
theory, the different ways in which theory is important to sociological
understanding, or the reasons why sociologists turn to theory. It is a useful
part of the disciplinary tool kit, better for some kinds of intellectual proj-
ects and problems than others, but poorly understood as definitive of the-
ory (or science or the advancement of knowledge) in general.
NARRATIVE AND HISTORICAL EPISTEMOLOGY
Somers challenges Kiser and Hechter on many fronts and raises a vari-
ety of concerns. Centrally, she argues that theory cannot escape history
and both misunderstands itself and introduces potential distortions into
its work if it tries to do so. The kind of general theory that Kiser and
Hechter advocate is, as we have seen, basically ahistorical (or, to put it
more positively, omnitemporal). This has two implications. One is that,
while this sort of theory can contribute to historical explanations, it does
not address the specifically historical dimensions of theory or explanatory
problems. The other is that theory of this sort tends to leave unexamined
the “presuppositional historical claims” that inform it (Somers, p. 731).
One of the points of Somers’s historical epistemology is to keep attention
focused on the embeddedness of all knowledge (as of all social life) in
history. This implies continually reexamining the ways in which both the
standpoint of the present and the specific histories of theory development
shape what we ask and do not ask and therefore what we know and do
not know.14
13 Elster (1985) has done something of this in the case of Marx. For a contrasting view,
in which Marx appears as a historical and critical theorist rather than an immature
rational choice theorist, see Postone (1993).
14 There is a close link here to arguments about the inescapability of hermeneutic
interpretation and the necessary limits to covering law theories and scientific predic-
tion. As Taylor’s ([1971] 1985, p. 48) classic statement goes, man is a “self-defining
animal.” “With changes in his self definition go changes in what man is, such that he
has to be understood in different terms. But the conceptual mutations in human his-
tory can and frequently do produce conceptual webs which are incommensurable, that
is, where the terms can’t be defined in relation to a common stratum of expressions.”
Elsewhere (Calhoun 1995) I have argued that such cultural incommensurability is
better understood as involving practices than simply terms. The very process of creat-
ing our contemporary webs of meaning—including our theories—implicates us in
some rather than other relationships to projects of historical understanding.
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Somers’s argument is rooted in a crucial point derived from Kuhn: the
history of the development of science explains as much about its current
patterns of knowledge as do its attempts at theoretical justification of its
knowledge claims. Theories—or paradigms—are seldom falsified (let
alone proved true). Rather, scientists are persuaded to shift from one the-
ory to another available one.15 This does not mean that there is no such
thing as falsification, rather that only fairly narrow empirical claims get
falsified. Falsification of these claims casts doubts on underlying theoreti-
cal structures from which they may be deduced or to which they may be
important. However, this is seldom if ever decisive in the actual abandon-
ment of theory. Most reasonably robust theories are indefinitely revisable,
and in any case an alternative theory needs to be presented that can suc-
ceed in competition with the one previously held. This may be a new
theory or, as often happens in social science, the recycling of an old, previ-
ously widely abandoned theory, now presented in modified form. This
last is precisely what happened with the redeployment of rational choice
theory in sociology (no longer called utilitarianism and shorn of some of
the assumptions that would have tied it to that early incarnation). Func-
tionalism has likewise come back into vogue after deep crisis. Marxism
may rise again, and so forth.
The significance of these points is more far-reaching than at first ap-
pears. For example, they raise questions about the idea of scientific prog-
ress. There are clearly new achievements in scientific understanding and
in technological capacities to manipulate the external world that are de-
rived from science. No serious scholar doubts this, and the charge of rela-
tivism hurled at post-Kuhnian science studies is at least overstated if not
a red herring.16 The problem is not that science does not help people to
do new things. It is rather that it is hard if not impossible to arrive at a
defensible metatheoretical position from which to assert that the succes-
sion of theoretical understandings represents a linear “progress.” A com-
monly stated ideal is that a new theory should be able not only to succeed
in all the explanatory tasks where a previous theory succeeded, but also
to succeed where the old theory failed and perhaps even explain why the
old theory failed. Even in the paradigm case of relativity theory versus
15 In the following discussion, in accord with widespread sociological usage, I will
generally use the word “theories” for the complex structures of theories and research
approaches that Kuhn termed paradigms and not attempt to restrict it to a narrower
sense of specific theories within a broader paradigm.
16 In a typical overstatement, Kiser and Hechter (p. 788) accuse Somers of holding
that “science is nothing but a social construction,” as though she implied that all social
constructions deserved equal epistemological credence. In claiming that science is a
social construction, she never claims that there is nothing more to say about it or its
efficacy, nor does she take a radically relativist (as distinct from relational) position.
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Newtonian mechanics, it is not clear that this is a good account of what
happened. In any case—and this is important to Somers’s argument—it
is a narrative account of what happened, not a set of changes in under-
standing deducible from general laws of either nature or human rea-
soning.17
When theories contend and one gains more widespread adherence, this
is seldom based on a confrontation between each of the theories in its
entirety. Rather, certain parts or features of each theory are brought to
the fore and become crucial to the assessment of their relative explanatory
power. Such assessment takes place, moreover, in relation to specific ex-
planatory problems. These problems are produced by research projects
that direct attention in some possible directions rather than others and
that focus attention on certain aspects of phenomena and not others. It
is often in the choice and framing of research problems that extrascientific
forces (e.g., funding agencies, governments, employers) have their greatest
effects. Extrascientific efforts to promote particular solutions to problems
are likely to be much less influential in the long run—at least where rela-
tively open scientific practice is involved. There are also reasons within
science but outside theory that help determine which problems become the
foci of research and the basis for contention among theories. For example,
available research technologies and the distribution of experience with
different material practices among scientists and laboratories may shape
what scientists choose to study. Scientific knowledge comes not simply
out of theories and tests but out of the “mangle of practice” (Pickering
1997). There is a potentially infinite range of research problems, so the
confrontation between theories is played out on an arbitrary subset. The
subset may be historically explicable but is unlikely to be amenable to
satisfactory justification within any theory let alone across theories. Thus
which problems scientists study (and which they do not) has an impact
on the direction of theoretical development. Even where there is clear
improvement in the ability to solve the particular problems addressed, we
have no basis for assessing this in relation to the problems not addressed.18
For these (and related) reasons, scholars in science studies since Kuhn
have argued that it is important to study the context of discovery as well
as efforts to justify knowledge claims. The context of discovery determines
17 Kuhn ([1962] 1970) did suggest that “rational reconstruction” could save the narra-
tive history of change in scientific theories from being subject only to hermeneutic
interpretation. Denying this is basic to both a more thoroughgoing pragmatism (Rorty)
and many so-called postmodernist challenges (e.g., Lyotard).
18 This holds without accepting Somers’s much stronger (and more contentious) state-
ment that “there are no universally valid principles of logical reasoning; there are only
problem-driven ones” (p. 766).
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both the range of theories available for comparison at any one time and
the specific research practices through which empirical observations may
be generated. Part of what Somers challenges in Kiser and Hechter is their
adherence to a discussion of theory and theory testing based mainly on
justification and their neglect of the significance of this dimension of
Kuhn’s argument.19
In a closely related point, Somers emphasizes Kuhn’s argument that it
is much more difficult than most philosophy (and ideology) of science sug-
gests to “articulate” or develop “points of contact between a theory and
nature” (Kuhn 1970, p. 30; quoted by Somers, p. 735 above). It is conceptu-
ally as well as sometimes materially hard to generate observations that
are genuinely effective in deciding for one theory and against another.20
As Somers points out, neither induction nor deduction solves the problem.
What exists between theory and research practice is not a relationship of
simple testing but one of sustained mutual engagement.
CAUSALITY
Kiser and Hechter (1991, p. 4) begin, Somers stresses, with a dubious em-
pirical claim. They assert that there is “wide agreement . . . across social
science” that causality is “the first requirement of an adequate explana-
tion.” Somers rightly responds that no such agreement exists, though I
think we might qualify this by noting that many social scientists, perhaps
even a majority, think casually that explanation is basically a matter of
identifying causes. The problem is that they do not go beyond such casual
thinking or they would run into the many difficulties with the assertion.
Somers perhaps does not distinguish clearly enough three kinds of diffi-
culties: (1) Different things are meant by explanation. (2) Different things
are meant by causation. (3) Even where social scientists definitely define
explanation as adducing causes, and mean the same thing by causes, such
causes are notoriously hard to prove.
19 I think this is also what Quadagno andKnapp (1992, p. 482) are getting at when they
write that it makes sense to “derive theoretical explanations from detailed narrative
histories.” Kiser and Hechter (pp. 795–96) mock them for asserting this, and for as-
serting that theory should provide researchers with questions, not just with answers
to be tested. Obviously, Quadagno and Knapp cannot mean the same logical operation
by “derive” as do Kiser and Hechter or anyone else speaking about deductive theoriz-
ing. But they are within the bounds of reasonable English usage, and they call atten-
tion to the difficulty of making sense of the role of theory without addressing the
practical production of knowledge, the context of discovery.
20 The issue is partly sheer difficulty, partly the tendency to be biased by theoretical
starting point. Somers (p. 760) approvingly cites Hollis (1994, p. 79): “In deciding on
which facts to select and transform into evidence, we are already to a large degree
deciding between rival theories.”
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Explanation.—The equation of explanation with causality has indeed
become widespread and is especially widespread in Anglo-Saxon philoso-
phy of science and scientific discourse. It is less widely shared in other
philosophical traditions and in ordinary language. Many social scientists
are influenced by other philosophical traditions, and quite a few even
speak ordinary language. Some, therefore, believe they can “explain”
something by saying what it means or how it works, not just what caused
it (or what it causes). This view is particularly salient in relation to histori-
cal inquiries (as to cross-cultural ones) because considerable effort may
be required to grasp the meanings that objects, phenomena, ideas, and
other people have for actors in very different social and cultural settings
(see Calhoun 1995, chaps. 2–3). As terms of art, scholars sometimes distin-
guish achieving understanding, in the sense just evoked, from explaining.
This follows the distinction between verstehen and erkla¨rung formulated
during the methodenstreit. The point of the distinction was to contrast
the attempt to produce knowledge through interpreting how historical
actors thought and felt, their practical orientations as well as their explic-
itly avowed intentions, and the attempt to produce knowledge through
study of external causal linkages. Understanding was held to be important
(by some) because the human sciences dealt with sentient beings who took
actions based on the meanings they found in or imputed to their worlds.
Explanation was held to be different not because it was more empirical,
but because it was more objective—including in the literal sense of treat-
ing people as objects rather than actors (in other words, making no distinc-
tion between action and behavior). This notion of causal explanation
achieved its apogee in social science (especially psychology and sociology)
in the era of behaviorism.
Covering laws and mechanisms are both examples of explaining by ad-
ducing external factors to account for behavior (or other events). The in-
teresting, perhaps even ironic, twist introduced by Kiser and Hechter
(along with Elster [1985], Coleman [1984], and many others) is to empha-
size causal explanation in an ostensibly voluntaristic theory. At least in
many versions, rational choice theory treats human beings as actors with
some degree of agency and makes reference to their motives and not
merely the external causes evoked by those who linked the notion of cause
with that of explanation during and after the methodenstreit.21 On Som-
21 Bentham was a strict behaviorist. This is a difference between some versions of
modern rational choice theory and classical utilitarianism. Rational choice theory in
this sense tries to combine what philosophers have sometimes distinguished as a logic
of natural relations and a logic of action (Dray 1964). Kiser and Hechter (pp. 789,
800) specifically identify their theory with intentional action rather than a more deter-
ministic logic of interests and argue that because of the importance of individual ac-
tion, sociologists “must employ a different methodology than that used in the natural
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ers’s reading (pp. 749, 752 above), Kiser and Hechter offer a theory of
“agents as mechanisms.”22 In doing so, they not only introduce rather sim-
plistic ontological claims about what people are like; more surprisingly,
they withdraw the apparent voluntarism of the theory. This is so, she
suggests, because they hold that mechanisms must be deducible from gen-
eral theories, so if an agent is a mechanism she cannot have much real
agency. The demand for microfoundations as part of all fully successful
theoretical explanations starts out looking like an opening to human rea-
son (as in the verstehen side of the methodenstreit) but (if the view of the
agent is as narrow as Somers suggests) ends up introducing a substantial
determinism and possibly an element of tautology into the theory.
Thinking of explanation only in terms of causality, and of theory only
in terms of the general theories that generate causal explanations, leaves
out many important efforts to achieve relatively general understandings
of social life. I have alluded already to the reasons why one might wish
to formulate intrinsically historical theories. A further example may be
clarifying specifically in relationship to causality. Some abstract categories
are important in theory, research, and everyday social life because they
constitute dimensions of the reality we study and in which we live. Money
is such a constitutive abstraction; its creation is a collectively achieved
performative investiture of value. The business corporation exists and is
treated in law as an artificial person (and so, in many respects, is the state;
see Coleman 1984). Nations are not simply found in external terms but
created in human history (though not necessarily through such discrete
events as the idea of “invention” implies). Their creation is partly based
sciences.” They do not say what this different methodology is; however, though they
do imply that it remains objectivist, rather than being strongly interpretative. They
maintain a strong distinction between individuals and contexts (p. 800) and insist on
“a social world existing outside the minds and sense perceptions of its participants”
(p. 789), and thus apparently not intersubjectively constructed.
22 Somers changes her account somewhat on p. 764 when she endorses Tilly’s (1995,
p. 1602) account of rational choice theory’s treatment of actors as “coherent, durable,
self-propelling social units-monads.” At this point she is interested (reasonably) in em-
phasizing the lack of a strong sense of the agents as social. She shifts, however, from
describing the agents as being mechanisms to describing them as the bearers of mecha-
nisms. In either case, they are causal forces in themselves, but in the second case one
could not conclude that Kiser and Hechter had taken away apparent voluntarism as
clearly as one could in the former. A somewhat related issue arises a page later. Somers
(p. 764) accuses Kiser and Hechter of “essentialism.” It seems to me that they (and
most rational choice theorists) have not actually offered a substantial enough account
of how they understand human agents for us to decide on this charge. It may be,
however, that the only way for rational choice theory to escape the charge of essen-
tialism is to relax its standards for microfoundations. If the agents are indeed mecha-
nisms, or have inherent causal power by virtue of fixed dispositions, then the charge
of essentialism is more likely to stick.
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on a rhetoric or discursive formation that makes it meaningful for people
to speak and think about and become emotionally committed to “their”
nations (Calhoun 1997a). To paraphrase W. I. Thomas, each of these phe-
nomena becomes real because we treat it as real in our actions. The exis-
tence of money, business corporations, and nations is basic to the modern
world. Explaining how this is so would seem to be important for sociologi-
cal theory.23 But is this project of explanation graspable entirely through
covering laws and causal mechanisms? Part of what we want to under-
stand is the transformation of the world by these new phenomena that
are created in and through culture. Explanation here may be achieved
partly through narrative, as Somers suggests, but this does not exhaust it
either. Critical inquiry into cultural categories may produce theoretical
explanations that are neither simply causal nor simply narrative.24
Causation.—Even in the heyday of covering law theory, one of its fore-
most defenders could write of the principle of causality that “there is no
generally accepted standard formulation of it, nor is there general agree-
ment as to what it affirms” (Nagel 1961, p. 316). Most of what passes for
causal analysis in the social sciences is in fact identification of more or
less “weak implication” between statistical variables (Boudon 1974). It is
very different from arguments as to strict causation. The issue here is not
specific to history; in fact, highly particularistic historical arguments may
sometimes come closer to the logic of strict causality than most quantita-
tive social science. Somers (pp. 746–47; original emphasis) implies that it
is an error for Kiser and Hechter to “attempt to combine a covering law
model logic based on empirical regularities with a method of imputed
23 As Somers notes, Kiser and Hechter make a good deal of the inability of comparative
historical sociology to achieve independence of cases. Their solution is to turn to
lower level, frequently repeated phenomena where they believe this is less of a prob-
lem. Somers (pp. 757–58) accuses them of presupposing (if not quite of holding) “that
cases are discovered as ready made, discreet entities—given in the nature of things,
that is—rather than constructed along analytic parameters.” While this may not be
altogether fair, it is certainly true that Kiser and Hechter offer little account of how
one would make the construction of cases an object of study, facilitating inquiry not
just into theory and its operationalization, but into the way the categories used by
many theories reflect the historical constitution of aspects of the world they observe
(as, e.g., by assuming nations, or events situated in national histories, as the units of
comparison).
24 One may argue that the first chapter of Capital, vol. 1 (Marx 1867), is a theoretical
account of such constitutive categories, of how the commodity form and abstract labor
constitute capitalism. This is not per se an account of the historical origins of capital-
ism—the sequence of steps by which it came into being. Nor is it a covering law
theory of either capitalism or the various features Marx identifies as central. Nor
further is it an account of the commodity form or abstract labor as causal mechanisms
producing capitalism. Rather, it is a theoretical statement of what capital (the basic
term in capitalism) is. In this sense, but not in Kiser and Hechter’s, it is an explanation.
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causal mechanisms.”25 This is not necessarily so. It is true that positivists
attempted to dispense with reference to unobservable causal mechanisms,
but not that all covering law theorists follow them in this. Moreover, until
the 1960s, most covering law theories were theories of strict causation.
Nagel (1961) and Hempel (1962) led the way in accepting probabilistic
and statistical laws in place of universal ones. An important result of this,
however, doesn’t get the attention it deserves from Kiser and Hechter.
This is the fact that when “laws” are probabilistic, it is no longer possible
in the ordinary logical sense to deduce an explanandum from an expla-
nans, though one may infer probability.
Problems of proof.—Proving causation is a formidable challenge; it is
met to varying degrees of satisfaction often enough that it remains mean-
ingful to speak of causal analysis in social science, but it is met in such
different ways that care is required before assuming common meaning.
Some will accept a causal argument as complete if it consists of necessary
but insufficient causes, others require necessity plus sufficiency. Some hold
that causality can link only events, others use the term to describe links
between properties or conditions and events. There is also the difficulty
that most phenomena in social life admit of multiple causes (under any
meaning of the term). Identical events, moreover, may result from com-
pletely different causal determinations (though some still dispute this,
sticking perhaps to Comte’s positivist dictum that there should be a one-
to-one match between causes and effects). Not least of all, there is the
question of determinism. Indeterminacy in the form of chance operates
alongside causality even in physics. As Wilhelm Dilthey and Heinrich
Rickert noted a century ago, in addition, to the extent that human beings
are held to be actors with free will, able to shape history by their inten-
tions, a different sort of indeterminacy is also introduced. This by no
means invalidates causal analysis. It merely means that “causation is just
one mode of determination, along with self-determination (or spontane-
ity), chance, and purpose” (Bunge 1996, p. 33).
25 Somers (p. 775) also says that Kiser and Hechter “create a hybrid standard for ex-
planatory adequacy by conflating the abstract conjunctions of predictive laws with
true causality.” This seems too strong, though their writing is ambiguous. Rather, I
read them as arguing for making use of both predictive, covering-law-style arguments
and attempts to identify causal mechanisms in the effort to produce fuller explana-
tions. There seems to be no contradiction in this so long as one keeps them conceptu-
ally distinct. Admittedly, Kiser and Hechter are sometimes unclear about how these
fit together at the level of philosophical underpinnings. In particular, they do not
address the question of what the implications are if (as I think is the case) they see
mechanisms working in a probabilistic rather than a strict causation model. This
would increase complexity by an order of magnitude and reduce the likely payoff to
deductive theorizing—at least until vastly more is known.
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CONCLUSION
I have suggested that the methodological divide drawn in this debate is
starker than is either widespread in or valuable for the practice of histori-
cal sociology. There is room for both general theory and narrative in the
explanation of sociologically significant historical phenomena. Moreover,
these two do not exhaust useful approaches to such explanation. In partic-
ular, though I have not taken the space to develop a positive argument,
I have indicated the importance of intrinsically historical theory. This in-
cludes both theory that is about the shape of history, its disjunctures as
well as its continuities, and theory that is self-conscious about its own
historical specificity and that of the phenomena it studies. It is striking
that Kiser and Hechter advocate a form of theory that can produce expla-
nations of microprocesses within important historical phenomena, but
that will tend to leave their historical importance as such to be accounted
for in other ways. Narrative can do some of the work, as Somers suggests,
but there is also need for the kind of historical sociology that both learns
from and problematizes narrative and that theorizes in nonnarrative
forms.
Kiser and Hechter’s 1991 article gets us off to a problematic start in
thinking about explanation in historical sociology by posing the question
in terms of sociology versus history, nomothetic-deductive theory versus
inductive or particularizing empirical inquiry. This not only polarizes; it
misstates the issues. The fact that Kiser and Hechter are open to argu-
ments based on statistical implication as well as strict causal universality
already takes them some distance from the strong ideal of nomothetic-
deductive theory as formulated in the methodenstreit. By the same token,
the terms “idiographic particularism” and “inductivism” poorly describe
actual historical research. In the more moderate passages of their contri-
bution published here, Kiser and Hechter indicate that they did not mean
to argue one-sidedly that the sort of work they advocated based on general
theory was the only good approach to sociological explanation. Their con-
cern, they say, was for the limits of a historical sociology that refused to
use such theory. Let us hope they are more worried than they need to be.
One of the drawbacks to thinking in terms of such binary oppositions
as general theory versus narrative is that we are not encouraged to exam-
ine the questions of whether the strategies may complement each other
or whether there are analytic problems that may call for one more than the
other. As a familiar example, consider Habermas’s (1984, 1988) famous
(if problematic) distinction of lifeworld from system. Part of Habermas’s
theoretical project was to distinguish dimensions of social life that could
be understood well in agent-centered accounts (including, implicitly, nar-
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ratives) and those that would be missed or systematically distorted if only
understood in such a way. Agent-centered hermeneutic accounts are
needed to make sense of friendship; they do a much less adequate job
in accounting for the operation of markets (though they are perhaps not
irrelevant).
To understand the global expansion of capitalism, for example, is a
historical problem. It is not a problem for historians rather than sociolo-
gists, because it is basic to the constitution of the contemporary social
world and almost everything we study in that world. But it is a problem
embedded in time, not just in the absolute but as constituted by the rela-
tions among changes in different parts of the system. Some of this will be
grasped only by narrative accounts, especially where the experience or
intentions of agents are crucial. Global capitalism also includes and indeed
is conditioned upon a variety of narrower processes. Some of these can
be (and are being) studied fruitfully by means of general theories more or
less like those Kiser and Hechter advocate. Others are better addressed
through middle range theories, in Merton’s (1968) sense. But global capi-
talism is also importantly a singularity, not merely a cumulation of differ-
ent instances of smaller, frequently repeated phenomena. It is important
for sociology to theorize it as such. This argues for a composite explanatory
strategy in which narrative and mechanistic or covering law explanations
can each play a part. Nonetheless, an explanation of what capitalism is
and how it works will exceed both narrative and discrete causal mecha-
nisms or covering laws.
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